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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING ON WAIVER 
AND REMAND WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF MRS. 
ROBERTS ON QUIET TITLE. 
The trial court found that "the fence between the Roberts and Russell was not on 
the boundary line, but encroached upon the Roberts' property by up to 14.5 feet." (R. at 
679.) This finding is sufficient to establish a prima facie case for quiet title. Dr. Russell 
did not assert any affirmative defenses against this claim at trial (R. at 683), and he does 
not attempt to do so now. Therefore, if this Court reverses the trial court's ruling on 
waiver, it would be appropriate to instruct the trial court to enter judgment quieting title 
of the disputed property in favor of Mrs. Roberts. See United States v. 449 Cases, 212 
F.2d 567, 573 (2nd Cir. 1954) (holding that an appellate court can instruct the district 
court to enter judgment when it appears that the findings of fact support it); John Wagner 
Assoc, v. Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123, 1133 (Utah App. 1990) ("Based on the 
uncontested facts, we remand and instruct the trial court to find for Wagner."). 
A. The trial court erred in concluding that the Roberts had waived their 
claim for quiet title. 
In her opening brief, Mrs. Roberts gives five separate grounds as to why the trial 
court erred when it concluded that Mr. Roberts waived the Roberts' claim for quiet title 
in his trial testimony: first, the statement did not evince a clear and unequivocal intent to 
waive a right; second, he had no authority to unilaterally waive the claim without Mrs. 
Roberts' consent; third, Mr. Roberts could not waive the claim by his trial testimony, as 
such an act could only be accomplished by a motion made by the Roberts' counsel; 
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fourth, that the trial court's finding of waiver was an impermissible amendment of the 
pleadings; and fifth, that there was no basis to support the application of waiver, as there 
was no consideration or detrimental reliance on Dr. Russell's part. Mrs. Roberts will not 
rehash these arguments, but will simply answer Dr. Russell's responses. 
With respect to the question of whether Mr. Roberts' statement manifested an 
unequivocal intent to waive his claim, Dr. Russell merely states that Mr. Roberts stated 
that "his only concern in this lawsuit was from his house 'going east.'" (Br. Appellee 11.) 
He does not address the fact that Mr. Roberts' statement was made in the context of the 
road to the west of his house, not the fence, or that the subject of the question was the 
Roberts' claim against the Purkeys, not Dr. Russell, or any of the circumstances brought 
up in Mrs. Roberts' opening brief that suggested that there was no intentional waiver. The 
context of the statement simply does not support intentional and unequivocal waiver of 
the Roberts' claim against Dr. Russell. 
With regard to the question of whether Mrs. Roberts' approval would be required 
to effectuate a waiver, Dr. Russell argues that Mrs. Roberts did not repudiate Mr. 
Roberts' supposed waiver. However, he fails to give any reason or cite to any authority 
that would indicate that Mrs. Roberts had "some duty or obligation to speak" that would 
form the basis for a waiver based on silence. See Soter 's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Sav. & 
Loan Ass % 857 P.2d 935, 940 (Utah 1993). Also, Dr. Russell does not dispute that Mr. 
Roberts had no authority to waive Mrs. Roberts' rights with respect to the claim for quiet 
7 
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title. Because Mr. Roberts could not waive the claim for quiet title without the consent of 
Mrs. Roberts, any such waiver would be ineffective.1 
With respect to Mrs. Roberts' argument that voluntary dismissal of a pending 
claim must come through a motion made by counsel and the order of the court "upon 
such terms and conditions as the court deems proper," see Utah R. Civ. P. 41(a), Dr. 
Russell does not dispute that a client represented by counsel cannot move to dismiss its 
action and that such a motion must come through counsel. Instead, Dr. Russell states that 
"a court may dismiss a claim sua sponte, without a motion by the defendant." (Br. 
Appellee 14.) This statement is non-responsive. First, Dr. Russell cites Rule 41(b), which 
deals with involuntary dismissals, while a dismissal under these facts would be voluntary. 
As a waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right, looking to the rule for 
involuntary dismissals makes no sense. Second, Rule 41(b) provides specific grounds for 
dismissing the action sua sponte. None of these grounds were cited by the trial court. As 
the alleged waiver was not submitted through counsel, by motion, the trial court 
improperly dismissed the Roberts' cause of action for quiet title. 
Finally, with respect to the question of whether the court's determination of 
waiver was an improper amendment, Dr. Russell argues that because "Mr. Roberts' 
waiver took place at the trial of this matter . . . , Dr. Russell could not have anticipated [it] 
1. In his brief, Dr. Russell suggests that he and Mrs. Roberts are now co-tenants. This 
misunderstands both the nature of the right that the trial court concluded was waived, and 
the legal effect of the trial court's decision. First, the trial court did not claim that Mr. 
Roberts waived his rights to the property. Rather, the trial court concluded that he had 
waived his claims against Dr. Russell for quiet title. (R. at 679, 683; Tr.2 50:16-18.) 
Second, a waiver is not a conveyance, and cannot be the basis for severance of a joint 
tenancy. There was no severance and Dr. Russell has no present interest in the subject 
property under the trial court's ruling. 
i 
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and therefore could not properly plead the affirmative defense of waiver prior to the trial 
of this matter." (Br. Appellee 14.) This statement supports Mrs. Roberts' argument that 
Dr. Russell took no action in reliance on the waiver and therefore the trial court erred in 
not allowing the Roberts to withdraw the waiver. This statement also contradicts his 
argument that the Roberts' failure to object to his "testimony regarding his understanding 
of the location of the property boundary line and Roberts' past conduct which implied the 
correct location of the fence in question" supports the conclusion that waiver was tried by 
implied consent. (Br. Appellee 15.) Dr. Russell does not explain what testimony about 
events prior to the trial would have to do with the alleged waiver, which happened at the 
trial. Moreover, Dr. Russell's argument that the issue of waiver was tried by implied 
consent misses the point. Even if the trial court believed that there was implied consent to 
tiy the issue, the trial court would still have to consider the issue of prejudice to the 
Roberts before amending the pleadings, and allow a continuance so that the Roberts 
could meet the new defense. See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b). Because Dr. Russell did not rely 
upon the waiver and the trial court did not allow the Roberts to refute the waiver, the trial 
court erred in concluding that the claim against Dr. Russell was waived. 
B. Whether Mr. Roberts' statement waived the Roberts' claim for quiet title ( 
against Dr. Russell is a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
Dr. Russell also points out that Mrs. Roberts did not marshal all the evidence in 
support of the trial court's judgment. However, a party is only required to marshal the 
evidence in favor of a challenged factual finding, not a challenged conclusion of law. See 
Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, Tf 17 n.4, 994 P.2d 193. As Mrs. Roberts notes in her 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
opening brief, since the issues raised in this appeal are questions of law, the marshaling 
requirement does not apply. (See Br. Appellant 1-2). 
This Court has previously noted the difficulty of articulating the standard of 
review with respect to mixed questions of law and fact such as waiver. See State v. Vigil, 
815 P.2d 1296, 1298-1300 (Utah App. 1991) (determining the proper standard of review 
for whether consent to search was voluntary). This Court analyzed this question based on 
the core functions of trial and appellate courts, noting that "the trial judge is in the best 
position to sift witness credibility and the accuracy of conflicting evidence," and that 
"collegial appellate courts" are in the best position to resolve "legal conclusions and 
ultimate facts." Id at 1299. Ultimately, this Court concluded that 
the determinant factor in selecting the proper standard of appellate review 
for mixed questions of law and fact is whether the first step—elucidation of 
historical facts—or the second step—correct application of the proper rule 
of law—is challenged on appeal. While we normally do not intrude on the 
trial court's resolution in the first step, we independently assess the legal 
conclusions generated in the second step for correctness. 
M a t 1300. 
In this case, the facts upon which the waiver is based are not in dispute and plain 
from the record. There are no issues of credibility or conflicting evidence for the trial 
court to weigh. Therefore, the question presented in this matter is a pure question of law.2 
2. See In re Estate ofUzelac, 2005 UT App 234, ^ 10, 114 P.3d 1164 (when the facts 
constituting the waiver are not in dispute, waiver is a question of law); B.R. Woodward 
Marketing, Inc. v. Collins Food Service, Inc., 754 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah App. 1988) ("In 
this case, the material facts concerning Woodward's conduct... are undisputed. 
However, Woodward claims that its conduct does not compel the conclusion, as a matter 
of law, that it waived its right to compensation under the agreement."); Vessels Oil & Gas 
Co. v. Coastal Refining & Marketing, Inc., 764 P.2d 391, 392 (Colo. App. 1988) 
("Where . . . the facts are uncontested and the evidence before the trial court is entirely 
c 
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C Mrs. Roberts fulfilled the marshaling requirement in her opening brief. 
Furthermore, Mrs. Roberts has adequately marshaled the evidence supporting 
waiver in her opening brief. "In order to properly discharge the marshaling duty," an 
appellant must present all of the evidence that supports the findings that the appellant 
challenges, and then "ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence" to show why that evidence 
does not support the conclusion. Oneida/SLICv. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse, 
Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah App. 1994). While Mrs. Roberts did not specifically 
identify her efforts as "marshaling the evidence," she has fulfilled the substance of both 
requirements and has adequately discharged her marshaling duty. See id. at 1053-54 
(clarifying the purposes of the marshaling requirement). 
Mrs. Roberts presented all of the relevant evidence in support of the trial court's 
finding of waiver. In its written rulings, the trial court is clear that the "evidence"3 it 
relied upon to make its determination of waiver consisted of Mr. Roberts' response to the 
documentary, the waiver issue becomes a matter of law, and we are not bound by the trial 
court's findings."); see also Rancho Pescado, Inc. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 680 
P.2d 1235, 1240-41 (Ariz. App. 1984) (whether a letter constituted a repudiation of a 
contract is a question of law); Nuco Plastics, Inc. v. Universal Plastics, Inc., 601 N.E.2d 
152, 154-55 (Ohio App. 1991) ("However, whether the actions of appellant, which are 
facts to be found by the trial court, constitute a repudiation of the contract is a question of 
law."). 
3. Calling Mr. Roberts' answer to the trial court's question evidence of waiver is a 
misclassification. Evidence is "something that tends to prove or disprove the existence of 
an alleged fact." Black's Law Dictionary 595 (8th ed. 1999). Words that have a legal 
effect, such as entering into an oral contract, are not evidence; rather, they are verbal acts. 
See John C Cutler Ass'n v. De Jay Stores, 279 P.2d 700, 706 (Utah 1955) (Wade, J., 
concurring). Just as a written, executed contract is not "evidence" of a contract, Mr. 
Roberts' statement either constituted a waiver or it did not, but it is not "evidence" of a 
waiver, and the issue of weighing credibility does not come into play. See id. (explaining 
that verbal acts are not testimonial evidence). 
fs 
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trial court's questioning. (See R. at 679 fl[ 15); 880 fl[ 3).) Dr. Russell concedes this in his 
brief (see Br. Appellee 7-8, 10-11) and does not identify any other evidence in support of 
waiver that Mrs. Roberts failed to marshal. When a party shows that certain facts were 
not relied upon by the trial court in making its decision, those facts are not relevant and 
do not need to be marshaled. Taylor v. Taylor, 2011 UT App 331,^8, P.3d ; 
Harding v. Bell 2002 UT 108, ^  21, 57 P.3d 1093. Further, Mrs. Roberts has pointed out 
the fatal flaw in this evidence by showing that, in context, Mr. Roberts' statement was not 
meant to apply to the claim for quiet title against Dr. Russell. 
However, if this Court determines that Mrs. Roberts was deficient in any duty she 
may have had to marshal the evidence, it does not follow that "this Court should decline 
the Appellant's request to overturn the District Court's rulings in this matter." (Br. 
Appellee 9.) While parties are obligated to marshal the evidence supporting a challenged 
finding, this Court "retains discretion to consider independently the whole record and 
determine if the decision below has adequate factual support." Martinez v. Media-
Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2007 UT 42, \ 20, 164 P.3d 
384. Because this case deals with a narrow issue, the relevant portion of the record is not 
voluminous, and there is adequate citations and references to all of the evidence in Mrs. 
Roberts' opening brief, the Court would not become "a depository in which the appealing 
party may dump the burden of argument and research." See State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 
487,491 (Utah App. 1992). Mrs. Roberts therefore requests that the Court decide the 
issues presented by this appeal, and to excuse any non-compliance as non-substantial. 
Finally, even if the Court were to decline to review the question of whether Mr. Roberts 
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intended to waive the cause of action for quiet title against Dr. Russell, there is still the 
question of whether the waiver is legally effective. As shown supra, it is not. Therefore, 
this Court should reverse the trial court's conclusion of waiver and direct the trial court to 
enter an order quieting title of the disputed property to Mrs. Roberts. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING ON TRESPASS 
AND REMAND WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF MRS. 
ROBERTS. 
Dr. Russell's brief on this point simply recites the trial court's conclusions and 
fails to respond to any of Mrs. Roberts' arguments against those conclusions. Therefore, 
Mrs. Roberts stands on the arguments made in her opening brief. The trial court' finding 
that Dr. Russell's fence is encroaching on the Roberts' property (R. at 679) is sufficient 
for this Court to reverse and instruct the trial court to enter a judgment ordering Dr. 
Russell to cease trespassing by removing his fence from the Roberts' property. 
III. THE COURT SHOULD REMAND WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AWARD MRS. ROBERTS 
HER REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS AS PER THE OCTOBER 14, 2009 
ORDER. 
Because the Roberts proved their prima facie case for quiet title and trespass 
against Dr. Russell in this matter and Dr. Russell did not plead or prove any affirmative 
defense, Dr. Russell did not prevail in his defense and so Mrs. Roberts is entitled to her 
reasonable attorney fees from May 27,2009 to the present. Dr. Russell makes two points, 
which are addressed below. 
First, Dr. Russell states that "this matter does not fall under any previously 
recognized exception to the general rule against awarding attorney fees in tort cases. 
Moreover, [Appellant] has cited no statutory reference to guide this court in awarding 
R 
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attorney fees." (Br. Appellee 17.) This is false. As stated in pages 5 and 25 of Mrs. 
Roberts' opening brief, the award of attorney fees is authorized by the lower court's order 
of October 14, 2009, which provided as a condition of setting aside the judgment that "if 
Cross-Defendant does not prevail in his defense, Cross-Claimants shall be entitled to 
their reasonable attorney's fees from . . . May 27, 2009." (R. at 395.) A trial court can set 
reasonable conditions for setting aside a judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) (allowing the 
court to set aside judgments "upon such terms as are just"); Powerserve InVl v Lavi, 239 
F.3d 508, 515 (2nd Cir. 2001) ("In determining whether to exercise its discretion to set 
aside a default, a district court has inherent power to impose a reasonable condition on 
the vacatur in order to avoid undue prejudice to the opposing party."); Thorpe v. Thorpe, 
364 F.2d 692, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("In granting a motion to vacate a default judgment 
the District Court may impose reasonable conditions."); 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 713 
(2011); see also Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 249 (Utah 1993) (recognizing a 
district court's inherent authority to award attorney fees). Dr. Russell did not raise the 
issue of the reasonableness of the trial court's order below, nor does he attempt to argue 
this now. 
Second, Dr. Russell states that the trial court "found that no party prevailed in this 
litigation . . . ." (Br. Appellee 17.) This is not exactly true—the trial court did not/zra/that 
no party prevailed, rather the trial court made this is a conclusion of law. The Roberts' 
point in bringing up this issue is that the trial court's conclusion was in error. While it is 
true that "trial courts apply a flexible and reasoned approach to the determination of who 
prevailed at trial," Gallegos v. Lloyd, 2008 UT App 40, ^  13, 178 P.3d 922, this 
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discretion is not without bounds. Based on the language and purpose of the Court's 
previous order, the failure of Dr. Russell to provide any affirmative defense, and the 
Roberts successfully proving their prima facie case for quiet title and trespass, for the 
trial court to say that Dr. Russell had "prevailed in his defense" was an abuse of 
discretion.4 This Court should reverse and instruct the trial court to determine an 
appropriate award of attorney fees in this matter, including attorney fees expended on 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, respectfully asks this Court to reverse the trial court's 
decision and remand for a new trial in this matter, and for an order of attorney fees and 
costs expended on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of November, 2011. 
/S/ Nathan Whittaker 
Nathan Whittaker 
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST, L.C. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
4. Again, Mrs. Roberts met whatever marshaling burden that she may have had in 
her opening brief. "Prevailing in the litigation" is either a conclusion of law or an 
ultimate fact; either one is subject to de novo review. See Vigil, 815 P.2d at 1299. Mrs. 
Roberts reviewed both findings of fact that could have led to this conclusion—the court's 
sua sponte finding of waiver and the fact that the boundary was not off by 32 feet as 
stated in the cross-complaint—and showed why they were not sufficient grounds for the 
trial court to conclude that Dr. Russell had prevailed in his defense. (See Br. Appellant 
25-26; 25 n.8.) 
10 
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